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Essay
The Task of the Federal Judiciary*
Edward Dumbauld**
It has been said of the celebrated Sir William Blackstone that
perhaps his greatest merit as a judge lay in his abstention from
saying any unnecessary word.'
When today I depart from Blackstone's prudent practice by ad-
dressing this Forum I am sure that the unbounded respect and af-
fection which members of this Club entertain for Dr. Ray Miller
will be regarded as sufficient justification for my improvident ac-
quiescence in his summons.
In describing the functions of the federal judiciary, a natural di-
vision of the topic is to emphasize first, that the federal courts are
federal, not the entire judicial structure in our nation, and second,
that they are courts, not legislative bodies or executive agencies.
Much of the important litigation and formulation of legal rules
affecting our daily lives takes place in state courts. To illustrate, in
1970, Congress established in the District of Columbia a local court
system equivalent to the state courts existing in other parts of the
country, thus enabling the federal district court and court of ap-
peals in the District to function as their counterparts throughout
the nation do, without the added burden of local district
* A condensed oral version of this article was presented at the Noon Forum of the
Cosmos Club, of Washington, D.C. The club is "composed of men who have done
meritorious original work in science, literature, or the arts; or . . . who are recognized as
distinguished in a learned profession or in public service." Lawyer members are few,
however, in comparison with atomic physicists, engineers, geologists, and other scientists.
Accordingly, appropriate presentation of the topic to such an audience required clarity and
simplicity as well as rigorous legal scholarship.
** A.B. (Princeton) 1926; LL.B. (Harvard) 1929, LL.M. 1930; Dr. Jur. (University of
Leyden, The Netherlands) 1932; LL.D. (Findlay College) 1981. Honorary Vice-President,
American Society of International Law; Senior United States District Judge for the Western
District of Pennsylvania.




Federal courts have had occasion to emphasize that they do not
deal with divorce, marriage, probate of wills, and similar topics.'
Likewise run-of-the-mill crimes such as murder, rape, robbery,
burglary, larceny, traffic offenses and the like are local matters.
On the other hand, thefts from interstate shipments of freight
by truck or rail, or of social security checks from mail boxes, fail-
ure to file federal income tax returns and pay the tax due, monopo-
lization or restraint of interstate trade and commerce in violation
of the antitrust laws, infringement of patents, to give a few exam-
ples, present issues of legitimate federal concern entirely appropri-
ate for adjudication in federal courts. These are what we com-
monly call "federal questions," or, in constitutional language, cases
"arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties."4
To what extent the range of matters to which the federal judicial
power may constitutionally extend shall actually be committed to
the jurisdiction of particular federal courts is a matter for determi-
nation by Congress.' For example, the Supreme Court had no ap-
pellate jurisdiction in criminal cases until 1891 (1889 in capital of-
fenses) when Congress provided for such appeals.'
The range of business entrusted to federal courts is thus a mat-
ter within the control of Congress. This is true in two ways. First,
Congress can directly delineate the scope of the jurisdiction con-
ferred on federal courts. It can therefore expand the courts' juris-
diction rather than contract it. Likewise Congress can also add to
the volume of business of federal courts by enacting substantive
legislation on a multitude of topics, thus generating new questions
of statutory interpretation and enforcement. These increase the
number of cases which the courts must handle.
In like fashion the Supreme Court of the United States by artic-
ulating newly-hatched constitutional rights (especially for criminal
2. District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358,
84 Stat. 473 (1970), discussed in Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 367 (1974).
3. See cases cited in Blank v. Blank, 320 F. Supp. 1389, 1390-92 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
4. U.S. CONST. art. III.
5. The idiosyncratic and erroneous view of Justice Joseph Story in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 330-31 (1816), that Congress must "vest the whole judicial power" in
some federal court or courts has found no support in subsequent doctrine or practice. E.
DUMBAULD, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 159-60, 320-21, 360-62 (1965).
6. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 827 (1891). See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.




defendants, prisoners, illegal aliens, illegitimate children, fringe po-
litical parties, and the like) has generated a vast volume of addi-
tional litigation for the federal court system. These additional bur-
dens may be regarded as "self-inflicted wounds," to use the
familiar phrase of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes.7
When I became a federal judge in 1961, the judiciary numbered
305 district judges and 93 circuit judges, a total of 398. Twenty
years later, in 1981, the numbers were 623 district judges, 168 cir-
cuit judges, and a total of 791 respectively. The membership of the
Supreme Court remained fixed at 9 during this period.
The basic structure of the federal judiciary consists of three
levels of article III courts (by which is meant courts established
pursuant to article III of the Constitution of the United States and
composed therefore of judges holding "their Offices during good
Behaviour" and receiving "for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Of-
fice").8 These provisions regarding tenure and salary are designed
to preserve the independence of the judiciary vis-a-vis the other
two branches of the government. There are also special courts
which from time to time as required have been established pursu-
ant to other powers given by the Constitution, such as the power to
pay the debts of the United States, to establish uniform national
laws on bankruptcy, to regulate the land and naval forces, to gov-
ern the District of Columbia and other territories belonging to the
United States, and the like.
At the apex of the federal judicial pyramid is the Supreme
Court, which exercises ultimate appellate jurisdiction over federal
and state courts alike. What is not generally realized is that the
Supreme Court has substantial control over its own caseload. It
decides which cases it wishes to hear, and brings them up for con-
sideration by granting certiorari. Denial of certiorari permits the
decision of the court below to stand. Many people do not know
how strictly the Supreme Court limits the number of cases it ac-
cepts, and are often heard to exclaim when they lose below that
they will "take the case all the way to the Supreme Court."
The bottom level of the pyramid is composed of district courts.
There is at least one judicial district in every state.9 The interme-
diate level is composed of courts of appeals, which review the deci-
7. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SuPREME COURT OF THE UNrED STATES 50 (1928).
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
9. The judicial districts are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 81-131 (1976), and 28 U.S.C. § 132
(1976) establishing in each judicial district a district court.
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sions of the district courts. They also review decisions of adminis-
trative agencies, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
Federal Trade Commission, and the like. When the circuit courts
of appeals were created by Congress in 1891, there were nine judi-
cial circuits. In 1929 the Tenth Circuit was carved out of the
Eighth. In 1948 The District of Columbia was formally listed as a
circuit, although for over two decades previously it had been recog-
nized tangentially as a circuit by Congress and the Supreme
Court.10 The judicial circuits (except the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit) all include more than one state.
In 1981, a new Eleventh Circuit was created by splitting off part
of the Fifth Circuit. 1 In 1982 the Court of Claims and the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (both then article III courts) were
abolished and their functions combined in a new court, christened
with the weird appellation "the Court of the Federal Circuit." The
new court is to be deemed a Thirteenth Circuit although its pri-




10. The circuit courts of appeals were established by the Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517,
26 Stat. 826 (1891). The Tenth Circuit was created by the Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, 45
Stat. 1346 (1929). The District of Columbia was explicitly listed as a federal judicial circuit
by the Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 3, 62 Stat. 870 (1948), which changed the name of circuit
courts of appeals to courts of appeals simpliciter. Section 204(i) of the Packers and Stock-
yards Act of Aug. 15, 1921, ch. 64, 42 Stat. 163 (1921), provided that for purposes of regula-
tion of packers in the District of Columbia "[tihe term 'circuit court of appeals' . . . means
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia." In F.T.C. v. Klesner, 274 U.S. 145, 150,
158 (1927), the same term in the Federal Trade Commission Act was held to have given that
court the same authority to enforce the Commission's orders as had been given to "the
proper circuit courts of appeals" in other parts of the nation. In Swift & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 311, 323 (1928), Justice Brandeis held that the court "was a circuit court of
appeals within the meaning of the Transfer Act" of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 305, 42 Stat. 837
(1922), and hence should have transferred to the Supreme Court an appeal improperly
taken to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in an antitrust case. The Act of
Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 754, 50 Stat. 753 (1937), provided that "the term 'circuit court of appeals'
includes the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia; the term 'circuit'
includes the District of Columbia." For similar statements see Act of Feb. 11, 1938, ch. 25,
52 Stat. 28 (1938); Act of Aug. 5, 1939, ch. 433, 53 Stat. 1205 (1939); Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch.
501, 53 Stat. 1225 (1939); Act of Dec. 29, 1942, ch. 835, 56 Stat. 1094 (1942); Act of May 11,
1944, ch. 192, 58 Stat. 219 (1944); Act of June 26, 1944, ch. 277, 58 Stat. 358 (1944); Act of
Dec. 23, 1944, ch. 724, 58 Stat. 925 (1944). The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
was created by the Act of Feb. 9, 1893, ch. 74, 27 Stat. 434 (1893).
11. The new Eleventh Circuit includes Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. Texas, Louisi-
ana and Mississippi remain in the Fifth Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 41, as amended by Act of Oct.
14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (1980).
12. Act of April 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 25. A new "United States Claims Court" (not an
article III court) was created to handle matters of the sort previously within the jurisdiction
of the abolished article III court.
The Federal Judiciary
The courts of appeals, as has been noted, serve as an intermedi-
ate appellate court, below the Supreme Court. They sit in panels of
three judges. Normally these panels are composed of circuit judges,
while district judges sit in their respective district courts. But
many people do not know that any federal judge may sit on any
federal court except the Supreme Court when designated to do so
by the Chief Justice. 18 This flexibility permits maximum utilization
of judicial manpower in accordance with the fluctuating needs of
the various federal courts throughout the nation. Occasionally a
court of appeals will sit en banc to review important cases where
panels are in disagreement.
The district courts are trial courts, of general original jurisdic-
tion. There witnesses testify and other evidence is received into the
record of a case. In jury trials a verdict resolves questions of credi-
bility and determines the facts. The court of appeals does not re-
view facts, but hears legal arguments and reads briefs based upon a
printed record made in the tribunal below. It is more remote from
the living litigants. It must consider matters of elegantia juris, the
unity and coherence of the law, as well as whether a just result is
achieved in a particular case.
It is sometimes said that today the chief task of a federal judge
is not adjudication but administration.1 Similarly, Dr. George M.
Docherty, former pastor of the New York Avenue Church, used to
say that in America the pastor is more of an executive than a
scholar, as in Scotland.
Dispositions constitute the bottom line in measuring judicial ac-
tivity. Volume rather than quality is the goal. Promptness rather
than justice and correctness in judicial decisions is sought. This is
an unfortunate tendency. It results in viewing the courts as,
merchants moving their stock in trade rather than as scholars or
scientists (a more appropriate analogy) whose achievements re-
quire careful thought and reflection rather than speedy delivery of
staple articles of merchandise.
It is a distinctive characteristic of judicial work that fair and pa-
tient hearing, exhaustive research, studious consideration and eval-
uation of evidence and arguments, sound judgment and impartial
justice are indispensable features of the process pursuant to which
13. 28 U.S.C. §§ 291-96 (1976).
14. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District
Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 65 (1981); and Rubin, Bureaucratiza-





While courts should take advantage of modern office equipment
and procedures, such as computerized research and word process-
ing, they must never permit mere quantitative considerations to
dominate their activities. Paralegals, secretaries, court administra-
tors, and clerks should be used to dispose of clerical and adminis-
trative aspects of a court's work, such as monitoring compliance by
parties with time limits for filing papers, mutually convenient
dates for arguments, hearings, and trials, making travel arrange-
ments, finding documents in the files, fetching books from the li-
brary, and the like. As little as possible of the judge's time should
be devoted to such "donkey work" as Learned Hand called it. 5
But the judge's unique and distinctive task of conscientiously
judging the merits of legal propositions and of deciding cases in
accordance with the determinations reached upon the questions of
law involved must never be neglected or shirked by reason of the
press of business. This duty is undelegable and unescapable. It is
essential to the judicial process and is of paramount importance.
Judges must be alert to avoid the condemnation that "ye pay tithe
of mint and anise and cummin, and have omitted the weightier
matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith; these ought ye to
have done, and not to leave the other undone."'"
I recommend to your attention a book published in 1973 by then
Chief Judge Henry J. Friendly of the Second Circuit (regarded as
perhaps the most significant federal court in the nation in matters
of business law because of the importance of New York City as a
corporate and commercial center) entitled Federal Jurisdiction: A
General View. 7 Judge Friendly is an able thinker and I strongly
agree with what he has to say in this book. He undertakes to delin-
eate the tasks which it is desirable for federal courts to perform
today. After a glance at a "minimum model" (limiting federal ju-
risdiction to the bare bones of government litigation, admiralty,
bankruptcy, copyright, and patent matters) and at a "maximum
model" (where the jurisdiction conferred upon the courts by Con-
gress would extend to the utmost bounds of constitutional power),
Judge Friendly sets forth his own view regarding the most expedi-
ent scope and extent of federal jurisdiction under present-day
circumstances.
15. Rubin, supra note 11, at 654.
16. Matthew 23:23.
17. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973).
Vol. 22:449
The Federal Judiciary
His thesis is "that the general federal courts can best serve the
country if their jurisdiction is limited to tasks which are appropri-
ate to courts, which are best handled by courts of general rather
than specialized jurisdiction, and where the knowledge, tenure and
other qualities of federal judges can make a distinctive contribu-
tion."1 8 This judicious platform is elaborated in subsequent por-
tions of the book. Adherence to these criteria is particularly appro-
priate at a time when the courts are burdened with a heavy
caseload. Expanded jurisdiction, like lengthy oral arguments, is
tolerable only when abundant leisure time is available.
To relieve the increasing burden on federal courts, Judge
Friendly would eliminate criminal cases where no genuine federal
interest is infringed. "Why should the federal government care if a
Manhattan businessman takes his mistress to sleep with him in
Greenwich, Connecticut, although it would not if the love-nest
were in Port Chester, N.Y.?" 9 Another burden would be lightened
if prior resort to an administrative agency was required before
bringing suit in court in matters such as environmental quality,
civil rights, prison conditions, and the like. Moreover, Judge
Friendly believes certain types of cases "do not belong in the
courts at all:" those involving injuries to railroad and maritime
workers in the course of employment, and motor vehicle
accidents.20
Judge Friendly, like many Supreme Court justices, favors aboli-
tion of "diversity jurisdiction." That is the term which describes
cases "between citizens of different States" which the Constitution
includes in the enumeration of matters to which the judicial power
shall extend.2 The traditional justification for exercise of this ju-
risdiction is fear that state courts might be unfair to litigants from
other states. Whether there is any substantial basis in fact for this
distrust at the present time is debatable. Congress could abolish
diversity jurisdiction entirely if it wished; all cases which now come
to federal courts under this heading could be left to the state
courts. As a step towards curtailing the volume of diversity cases,
Congress in 1958 raised to $10,000 the minimum amount in contro-
versy which must be involved in order to bring a case based upon
diversity of citizenship into a federal court.2"
18. Id. at 13-14.
19. Id. at 58.
20. Id. at 129.
21. U. S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
22. Pub. L. No. 85-554 § 1, 72 Stat. 415 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331
1984
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While emphasizing my agreement with Judge Friendly's state-
ment that the jurisdiction of federal courts should be "limited to
tasks which are appropriate to courts" and that they should not
include matters which do not belong in the courts at all, I might
mention that it is perhaps debatable whether injuries to railroad
and maritime workers in the course of employment and motor ve-
hicle accidents should be classified among the matters which do
not belong in the courts at all.
Such matters have traditionally been handled by court proceed-
ings, and although administrative procedures like workmens com-
pensation and no-fault insurance might perhaps advantageously be
expanded to handle such matters, there is no objection in principle
to continuance of the traditional course of adjudication, and there
may be strong preferences on the part of some litigants for reten-
tion of the accustomed procedure.
But what I regard as matters which do not belong in the courts
at all are political questions of a legislative nature, and executive
tasks involving detailed management of public institutions. Courts
should not be expected to solve all problems and abolish all evils
which exist in society; or to rush in to fill the vacuum resulting
from failure of other branches of government to grapple with
pressing problems of the day.
We should remember Dean Pound's still-timely admonition to
respect "the limits of effective legal action."2 We should con-
stantly bear in mind that only "the judicial power" is prescribed
by the Constitution as the province of the courts. The "legislative
powers" granted by the Constitution are vested in Congress; the
"executive power" is vested in the President. The doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers, of checks and balances, is a fundamental feature
of our system of government.2
(1976)).
23. Roscoe Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Action, 3 A.B.A. J. 54, 65-70 (1917)
[address before the Pennsylvania Bar Association June 27, 1916]. For an example of judicial
assumption of legislative and administrative functions, see A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SU-
PREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 97 (1976).
24. The classical statement of the doctrine, equally applicable to the federal constitu-
tion, is found in article XXX of the Massachusetts constitution of 1780:
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exer-
cise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never
exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them, to the end it may be a
government of laws and not of men.
CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS (ed.), THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS IV, 230 (1851). BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND I, 50-51, 149-51 (1765) also expounded the
456 Vol. 22:449
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A court should not simply exercise naked power in accordance
with what seems good in its own sight. Judicial power must be ex-
ercised in accordance with the requirements of law. As stated by a
prominent French legal scholar, "A judicial remedy is the possibil-
ity of calling upon the judge to resolve a question of law and to
reach a decision which is the logical consequence of the solution
which he gives to the question of law."'25 Unlike a legislator or ad-
ministrator, a judge is not free to render a decision based solely on
considerations of justice, policy, expediency or convenience, but
must act in conformity with law.2 For the executive and legislative
branches of government, law merely prescribes the boundaries of
power, delineating its extent and limitations, but not dictating the
objectives and goals to achieve which is to be exercised within its
legitimate scope by the agents to which it is entrusted.
While it is generally known that nowhere in the Constitution is
it expressly stated that the Supreme Court has final authority to
interpret the Constitution in a manner binding upon other depart-
ments of the government (and Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln and
others have denied the existence of such authority), most lawyers
and officials are content to accept judicial review, in its traditional
scope, of legislative and executive action because they recognize
that "it is. . . the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is";27 that the Constitution is the supreme law of
the land;28 and that in case of conflict "that which is not supreme
must yield to that which is supreme. '29 The power of a court to
pass upon the constitutional validity of legislation is thus simply
one aspect of the court's ordinary power and duty to determine
doctrine.
25. DUGUIT, TRAITE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL II, 322 (2d ed. 1922), quoted in
DUMBAULD, INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIES 15 (1932).
26. DUMBAULD, INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIEs 4
(1932). In a primitive legal system, the function of courts may be to prevent violence by
settling controversies in any acceptable manner, rather than to give effect to legal rules. Id.
at 17; RoscoE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE I, 376 (1949): "The purpose is to reach a peaceable
solution, not to determine the truth exactly by a rational process in order to apply a remedy
with precision." See also JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, The Nature and Sources of the Law 100,
234: "the function of a judge is not mainly to declare the Law, but to maintain the peace by
deciding controversies.. . . To decide cases is . . . of the essence of judgeship."
27. Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). Art.
III, § 2, cl. 1 declares that the judicial power "shall extend to all Cases ... arising under
this Constitution."
28. U. S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
29. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 448 (1827). In McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 426 (1819), Marshall stated that "that authority which is supreme must control,
not yield to that over which it is supreme."
1984
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what the law is on a given matter after duly considering and evalu-
ating the various relevant elements entering into such a determina-
tion. The court is merely giving effect to the hierarchy of authority
embodied in the structure of the legal order when it holds that
what is lower must yield to what is higher.3 0
The orthodox doctrine of judicial review is well stated by Justice
Owen J. Roberts in a familiar passage:
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not
conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the Govern-
ment has only one duty-to lay the article of the Constitution which is in-
voked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the lat-
ter squares with the former. . . This Court neither approves nor condemns
any legislative policy. Its delicate and difficult office is to ascertain and de-
clare whether the legislation is in accordance with, or in contravention of,
the provisions of the Constitution; and, having done that, its duty ends.
3'
Nevertheless many recent decisions of the Supreme Court arouse
uneasiness because they enunciate rules which are not derivable by
any rational process of interpretation from the text of the Consti-
tution. Constitutional law is thus generated by a process of cere-
bral parthenogensis5 5
There are legal scholars today who proclaim that the process de-
scribed by Justice Roberts is simplistic; that it is the function of
the Court to ascertain and proclaim social policies based upon gen-
erally accepted values.3 8 A convincing demonstration can be made
that what the Supreme Court is basing its decisions upon is "an
unwritten constitution" rather than the document drafted in Phil-
adelphia in 1787 and amended subsequently on twenty-six
30. Dumbauld, Judicial Review and Popular Sovereignty, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 199-
200 (1950); DUMBAULD, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 16-20 (1964).
31. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1936).
32. Lovelace v. Leechburg Area School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 579, 585 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
See also Griswold, Equal Justice under Law, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV 813, 817, 827 (1976).
One writer goes so far as to say that "the Constitution is essentially irrelevant to Supreme
Court decision making." Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Reli-
gion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 4 (1978-
79). See also ARCHIBALD Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
49, 100, 106, 108-09, 112-14 (1976).
33. One scholar finds that the Supreme Court is usurping power but that this is legiti-
mate if it can be objectively demonstrated that the Court is better suited than other organs
of government to effectuate a national objective mandated by the Constitution and is not
merely giving effect to the Justices' own personal values. Louis LUSKY, By WHAT RIGHT? 6,
19, 21, 107 (1975). The distinction between general consensus and the idiosyncracies of indi-
vidual justices had frequently been emphasized by Justice Frankfurter. See cases cited in





Perhaps the current "constitutional" protection given to values
not found in the written document is merely a new form of Dean
Roscoe Pound's proposition that "authoritative traditional ideals"
form part of the law, alongside of authoritative legal materials and
a traditional professional technique.3 5 Or it may be a new form of
the natural law doctrine imposing upon government extra-consti-
tutional restraints "which grow out of the essential nature of all
free governments" or which are based upon the fundamental prin-
ciples of liberty and justice which lie at the foundation of a free
society and are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."36
Some values are declared by the Court to be "fundamental" and
legislation impairing claims based upon such important values is
prima facie "suspect" and is to be subjected to "strict scrutiny" by
courts and must be justified by an "impelling" public interest. A
mere "rational basis" for the legislature's decision (the "traditional
equal protection standard") is no longer sufficient to establish the
constitutionality of the assailed legislation.3 7 An "intermediate"
degree of scrutiny is applied to a third group of classifications; here
only substantial relation to an important interest is required.38
Current equal protection doctrine is one prominent area where it
is easy to believe that the Court has gone too far. Justice Robert
H. Jackson wisely observed that the equal protection clause should
be used more freely than the due process clause when the Supreme
Court strikes down legislation. "Invalidation of a statute or an or-
dinance on due process grounds leaves ungoverned and ungovern-
able conduct which many people find objectionable." On the other
hand, invocation of the equal protection clause "does not disable
any governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand. It
merely means that the prohibition or regulation must have a
broader impact." There is no more effective practical guarantee
34. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN. L. REV. 703
(1975). See also Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in Ameri-
can Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 844-49 (1978).
35. ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE II, 107, 116-23 (1959); Pound, The Ideal Element
in American Judicial Decision, 45 HARV. L. REV. 136 (1931).
36. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall 655, 663 (1875); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448
(1890); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); DUMBAULD, THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 41 (1950); DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND
WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 135 (1957); and Robert P. Reeder, Constitutional and Extra-Consti-
tutional Restraints, 61 U. PA. L. REV. 441 (1913).
37. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658-61 (1969).
38. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 203 (1982); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275 (1978);
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977).
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against arbitrary and unreasonable government "than to require
that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a mi-
nority must be imposed generally." Officials then cannot "escape
the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger
numbers were affected." Arbitrary action is much more likely to be
found "in the regulation of the few than of the many." 9
Nevertheless Justice Jackson can not be considered responsible
for opening the floodgates of "equal protection" with which the na-
tion has currently been inundated. The, Court's present generosity
in applying the equal protection clause smacks of the treatment of
unequals as equal which the Greek philosopher condemned.40 Su-
preme Court decisions go far towards abolishing distinctions be-
tween citizens and foreigners'4 1 legitimate and illegitimate chil-
dren,42 residents and non-residents,43 males and females," lawful
and unlawful immigrants
45 and many others.46
The general acceptance of the proposition that selected 47 provi-
39. Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111-13 (1949).
40. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 289 § 558, Book VIII (J. Davies, D. Vaughn, trans. 1921).
41. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973). The ultimate fate of Dido does not neces-
sarily await all who practice her policy: "Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur."
AzNEID, I, 574.
42. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977).
43. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
44. Craig v. Boren, 421 U.S. 190, 199 (1976); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,
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sions of the federal Bill of Rights became applicable to the states
by virtue of the fourteenth amendment has produced bizarre juris-
prudence. The result has been a departure from the principles that
courts should perform only judicial functions, and that the consti-
tutionally established boundaries between the respective spheres of
state and federal government should be scrupulously observed.
The historical evidence supporting this view is unconvincing. 8 The
first steps toward the current position were taken by the Nine Old
Men in connection with the first amendment.'9 Justice Black gave
major impetus to the doctrine: it was his belief that all parts of the
federal Bill of Rights were incorporated as fourteenth amendment
restrictions upon the states.50 This extreme view has never won ac-
ceptance by a majority of the Court.
Regardless of historical legality, perhaps the ultimate question is
whether what the Supreme Court is doing is what the people really
want.5' In an era of television and computer communications, the
information age, perhaps a single consolidated government, con-
trolled by a fluctuating majority of nine intelligent and reflective
jurists, is more desirable and responsive to present-day popular
needs than the federalism established by our eighteenth-century
founding fathers.
Perhaps in view of the mobility of our population it is a matter
of importance to all Americans to know that uniform minimum
standards of fairness and reasonableness are observed nationally. A
Massachusetts motorist might fall into the hands of Mississippi or
Georgia police, and be affected substantially by the practices prev-
alent in those sections of the country. Similarly an employee of a
national corporation might be transferred to a new plant at a rural
location in a backward state and experience the impact of inade-
quate public schools on his children.
48. I am fully persuaded by Charles Fairman's scholarly review of the legislative his-
tory of the fourteenth amendment. Fairman states that there is no foundation for the in-
corporationist view. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? 2 STAN. L. Rzv. 5 (1949). So was Justice Robert H. Jackson. Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250, 294 (1952). See also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 102 (1962).
49. DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 127-30, 133 (1957).
50. Id. at 135-36.
51. The late Professor Alfred H. Kelly, noting an impressive parallel between the Dred
Scott case, 19 How. 393 (1857) and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) in
that on both occasions the Supreme Court undertook to give a definitive answer, supposedly
based upon constitutional grounds, to a troublesome problem with regard to which public
opinion was decidedly split, concluded that the difference between the two situations was




It may be that the people really want the things that the Su-
preme Court has commanded. Though not based upon traditional
legal and constitutional principles and our political heritage of fed-
eralism, the measures prescribed by the Court may possibly be of
genuine benefit to the public."2
But many lawyers and judges may agree with Chief Justice Bur-
ger's lucid and cogent statement (dissenting from the recent deci-
sion in Plyler v. Doe requiring states to furnish public education to
illegal aliens):
Were it our business to set the Nation's social policy, I would agree with-
out hesitation that it is senseless for an enlightened society to deprive any
children-including illegal aliens-of an elementary education. . . . How-
ever, the Constitution does not . . . vest in this Court the authority to
strike down laws because they do not meet our standards of desirable social
policy, "wisdom," or "common sense." . . . We trespass on the assigned
function of the political branches under our structure of limited and sepa-
rated powers when we assume a policymaking role as the Court does today.
The Court makes no attempt to disguise that it is acting to make up for
Congress' lack of "effective leadership" in dealing with the serious national
problems caused by the influx of uncountable millions of illegal aliens across
our borders . . . However it is not the function of the judiciary to provide
"effective leadership" simply because the political branches of government
fail to do so.
The Court's holding today manifests the justly criticized judicial tendency
to attempt speedy and wholesale formulation of "remedies" for the failures
- or simply the laggard pace - of the political processes of our system of
government. The Court employs, and in my view abuses, the Fourteenth
Amendment in an effort to become an omnipotent and omniscient problem
solver. That the motives for doing so are noble and compassionate does not
alter the fact that the Court distorts our constitutional function to make
amends for the defaults of others ...
The Constitution does not provide a cure for every social ill, nor does it
vest judges with a mandate to try to remedy every social problem ...
Moreover, when this Court rushes in to remedy what it perceives to be the
failings of the political processes, it deprives those processes of an opportu-
nity to function. When the political institutions are not forced to exercise
constitutionally allocated powers and responsibilities, those powers, like
muscles not used, tend to atrophy. Today's cases, I regret to say, present yet
another example of unwarranted judicial action which in the long run tends
to contribute to the weakening of our political processes.... [Ilnstead of
allowing the political processes to run their course - albeit with some delay
- the Court seeks to do Congress' job for it, compensating for congressional
inaction. It is not unreasonable to think that this encourages the political
branches to pass their problems to the judiciary.




The solution to this seemingly intractable problem is to defer to the polit-
ical processes, unpalatable as that may be to some."3
Some years ago a popular slogan among Presbyterians was "Let
the Church be the Church." This idea expressed the concern that
the church was losing its unique and distinctive religious mission
by becoming "conformed to this world"' 4 and functioning merely
as another secular social welfare organization. In like manner I
would exclaim "Let the courts be courts" and "Let the federal
courts be federal courts." Let them be judicial tribunals, whose ac-
tions are not dictated merely by expediency or morality, but
designed to carry into effect their conscientious decisions upon
questions of law; and let their adjudication deal with matters of
genuine national concern.
53. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242-43, 253-54 (1982).
54. Romans 12:2.
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